中日利益交汇点1何在? 不可否认,在21世纪中日两国战略利益是存在新的交汇点的。首先,共同对付非传统威胁2是中日战略利益的交汇点之一。随着冷战后国际形势的发 展,特别是“9*11”事件、非典疫情爆发以来3,对非传统安全问题的关注明显上升,共同 对付非传统威胁的战略需要必将成为连接21世纪中日关系的强韧纽带。 其次,在传统安全方面加强合作也是中日战略利益的一个重要交汇点。在传统安全方面,在中日双方尚难以达到互信4的状况下,就会特别关注对方的力量发 展和如何使用这种力量的意图。因此,中日两国应该以对等、正常、实事求是的心态来看待 对方发展。在1998年签署的中日《共同声明》中,中国已同日本达成了建立“致力于和平 与发展的友好合作的伙伴关系”的共识,5今后需要真正将这种伙伴关系落到实处。 第三,“中日不再战”是两国战略利益的最根本的交汇点。中日两国是“一衣带水”6的邻邦,这不仅意味着合作起来很方便而且也意味着加害于 对方也很方便7,特别是现代战争技术已经使得受害方立即实施报复成为可能,如果我们两 大邻国再爆发战争,其结果必定是“双输”。8在一定意义上或许可以说,“中日不再战”是 中日两国战略利益的“最大交汇点”。 政治是经济的集中表现。日本成为“经济大国”的现实必然要反映到政治上来。曰本走向“政治大国”9是国际格局多极化使然。但是,在日趋紧密的日美同盟之下, 曰本尽管有做“政治大国”的愿望,其外交在本质上依然摆脱不了对美从属的“中等国家 外交”的境界。10 当然,日美关系中既然有美对日控制的一面,就必然有日对美反控制的一面。11 20世纪 90年代以来,日本通过参加联合国维和活动,在不少“热点”地区的冲突中发挥出自己的作 用。可以认为,日本对美独立性的增强是日本走向“政治大国”的前提条件,从这个意义 上说,美对日成为真正的“政治大国”是不会高兴不会支持的,12因为这意味着日本会逐渐 变得不那么“紧跟”,不那么听话,甚至成为像某些欧洲国家那样敢于顶撞美国13的国家。 然而,在国际社会看来,日本发挥政治大国的作用符合多极化发展趋势。一国的国家利益包括经济利益、安全利益、政治利益、社会利益等,中日两国的经济利 益、安全利益、政治利益、社会利益等方面均存在着“利益交汇之处”。鉴于中日两国都把发展经济作为国家的首要任务,因此可以说经济利益也是中日国家利 益交汇的基础和核心,发展中日经贸合作既符合中日两国的利益,也符合经济全球化的 潮流。 当今中国仍面临着实现工业化的任务,那么,如何利用和借鉴日本的工业化技术和经验 来加快中国工业化,就成为我国发展对日关系的根本利益所在。14而日本也需要从中国的快 速经济增长和充满活力的改革中获益,这又成为日本发展对华关系的根本利益所在。 中日两国有着各自的生产要素优势15,如劳动力、土地、技术、资金、管理等,发展中 日经济合作可以促使两国各自优势的活力竞相迸发,这也是发展中日经贸关系的根本目的之 所在。16

参考答案: What Are the Mutual Interests that Link China and Japan?

There are some undeniable new links in the strategic interests of China and Japan in the 21st century.

First is dealing with non-traditional threats to security. With the development of the international situation since the end of the Cold War, in particular since the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11,2001,and the outbreak of SARS ( severe acute respiratory syndrome) in 2003, there has been an obvious increase in awareness of non-traditional security threats. Jointly coping with the challenges/The strategic needs to jointly cope with the challenges posed by those threats will surely become a strong link in the relationship between China and Japan in the 21st century.
Second, enhancing cooperation in the field of traditional security is also a cornerstone of Sino-Japanese strategic interests.

With regard to traditional security, since mutual trust has not yet been achieved, both sides will be especially concerned with the other’s growing power and how that power could be used. Thus China and Japan should treat each other’s development with an equal, normal and realistic attitude. Both countries have reached a consensus on establishing “ a friendly cooperative partnership devoted to peace and development,” which was demonstrated in their joint statement signed in 1998. What we need to do in the future is to realize this consensus.

Third, “no more war between China and Japan” is the most fundamental common ground linking the strategic interests of the two countries.
China and Japan are close neighbors separated only by a strip of water. This indicates that it is convenient either to cooperate with each other or do harm to each other. Modem military technology has made it absolutely certain that the one who does harm to the other will face immediate retaliation. If a war broke out between us two neighbors,there would be nothing else but a no-win consequence. Therefore, to some extent, “no more war between China and Japan” is the most basic joining point of strategic interests between the two countries.

Politics is a reflection of the economy. The fact that Japan is an economic giant will surely be reflected in politics.

Japan’s becoming “a major political power” resulted from the trend of multi-polarization in the international structure. However, under the increasingly close Japan-US alliance, Japan’s diplomatic clout has not gone beyond being a medium nation subordinate to the United States, despite its wish of becoming “ a major political power”.

Of course, there are two sides to every coin. Since the 1990s, by participating in the United Nations’ peacekeeping activities, Japan has played its own part in many “hot spots” around the world. It can be argued that Japan’s being independent of the United States is the pre-condition of its becoming “a major political power. ” In this respect, the United States will not really be pleased with and supportive of Japan’s ascension to “a major political power” because this means Japan will no longer be so closely aligned with America, or like some European countries, will even dare to say no to the United States.

But from the viewpoint of the international community, Japan’s role as a major political power is in line with the developing trend of multi-polarization.

National interests of a country include economic interests,security interests,political interests and social interests, etc. There are joining points in economic, security, political and social interests between China and Japan.

Since both China and Japan regard developing economy as the primary task of the nation, economic interests are at the core of their national interests. Developing Sino-Japanese economic and trade cooperation conforms to not only the interests of both countries but also the trend of economic globalization.

China is still faced with the task of realizing industrialization. Hence, the fundamental interests of China’s relations with Japan lie in how to make use of and learn from Japan’s technology and experience to accelerate China’s industrialization. While on Japan’s part, it is of fundamental interest to benefit from China’s rapid economic growth and energetic reform.

China and Japan have their respective advantages regarding productive factors,such as labor forces, land, technology, capital and management. Developing Sino-Japanese economic cooperation can help activate the respective advantages of the two countries, which is also a fundamental objective in developing Sino-Japanese economic and trade relationship.
解题思路: “中日利益交汇点”指的是中日两国之间的共同利益,既可直译为joining points in (national) interests,也可意译为 mutual interests。
1.“非传统威胁”意为对国家安全的威胁,如只按字面意思直译为non-traditional threats,读 者的理解可能会产生偏差,建议译者加上security—词,以使意思更为明确。
2.如果目标读者非常熟悉“9*11”事件及“非典疫情爆发”的话,译者可将其直译 为9 • 11 (terrorist) attack和the outbreak of SARS ;如果目标读者对二者不熟悉的话, 译者可简要地说明事件的性质、发生的时间、地点等,以帮助读者更好地理解文章 的原意。
3.在翻译“达到互信”这一词组时,“达到”一词既可译为achieve,也可译为establish。
4.汉语的词序相对固定,常常先讲明条件、时间、地点等,然后再讲结果。而英语的词序 相对灵活,往往先讲结果,再说明条件、时间等信息。译者在处理这句话时可根据英语 的行文习惯将“中国已同日本达成……共识”这一结果放在句首,然后再用定语从句等 方式将“在I"8年……《共同声明》中”这部分译出。
5.“一衣带水”指像衣带那样窄的河流,用以形容虽有江河湖海相隔,但仍像隔一衣带,极 其相近,可译为a (narrow) strip of water0本文强调中日两国是近邻的关系,译者在处理 这部分时,除直接说出separated only by a strip of water以外,还可以采用增词法加上 “近邻(dose neighbors)” 二字,使文中所强调的意思更为明了。
6.这部分如果直译为itis convenient to... and it is also convenient to的句式亦不为错,缺点是 稍嫌重复、累赘。较理想的翻译方式是采用it is convenient either to... or...和it is convenient not only to... but also.•.的句式,显得比较简洁、流畅。
7.此句只是一种不希望成为现实的假设,应使用虚拟语气来处理。
8.“政治大国” 一词可译为 a major/big/great political power, political giant 等。
9.此句与Note6有一定的相似之处。汉语原文是条件在前,结果在后,而译者在处理此句
时可采用结果在前,条件在后的语序进行翻译。
10.此句可以采用直译的方法将原文的意思一一译出,但还有一种更好的处理方式。英语习 语 there are two sides to every coin/every coin has two sides 的含义与原文的本质意义几乎 完全一致,如用这个习语来翻译此句的话,则整句话不仅言简意赅,而且给人以淋漓尽 致的感觉。
11.处理此句时应注意将“不会高兴”与“不会支持”两个不同的概念清楚地表达出来。
12.“顶撞美国”在文中的含义是与美国持不同意见,对美国所提出的要求或建议不予赞同 或合作,译者可以用say no to...这一词组来表达。
13.此句的主语相对句中的其它成分而言比较长,如果机械地按原文顺序将此句译出的话, 则整句话显得头重脚轻、很不平衡。建议译者可改变原文的语序,用形式主语it的方式 或…lie in…的句式译出此句。
14.“生产要素优势”指的是生产要素方面的优势,译者可用regarding, with regard to或in 一类的介词或介词短语来处理。
15.文中最后一部分译成独立的句子,如Thisis also a fundamental objective...也未尝不可, 但如果用非限制性定语从句...,which is also a fundamental objective来处理的话,整句话 的结构就会显得更为紧凑、合理。
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